abstract: We compare alternative information security policies-facilitating enduser precautions and enforcement against attackers. The context is mass and targeted attacks, taking account of strategic interactions between end users and attackers. For both mass and targeted attacks, facilitating end-user precautions reduces the expected loss of end users. However, the impact of enforcement on expected loss depends on the balance between deterrence and slackening of end-user precautions. Facilitating end-user precautions is more effective than enforcement against attackers when the cost of precautions and the cost of attacks are lower. With targeted attacks, facilitating end-user precautions is more effective for users with relatively high valuation of information security, while enforcement against attackers is more effective for users with relatively low valuation of security. [20, 32] and that security efforts reduce virus attacks [25].
experiencing up to 10 security incidents and 26 percent reported 10 or more incidents, suffering average losses of $350,424. against the backdrop of viruses and worms, phishing and pharming, denial of service attacks, and other infringements of information security, it is now recognized that information security is as much a technical issue as one of economic incentives [1] . 1 academic scholarship has provided important normative analyses: how much end users should invest in information security [14, 22, 23] , vendor policies toward user patching [2] and vulnerability disclosure [12, 13] , and government policies toward investigation of vulnerabilities [21] and disclosure [4, 30, 38] . The normative analyses have been supported by various empirical studies showing that deterrent measures do reduce information security incidents [20, 32] and that security efforts reduce virus attacks [25] .
Obviously, information security presents externalities that warrant government intervention. However, academic studies of information security have tended to focus on the government's role in regulating disclosure of vulnerabilities and encouraging patching. They have tended to overlook the government's enforcement function. Information security is like any other aspect of security in the sense that externalities are sufficiently severe as to warrant the application of criminal law. Indeed, empirical studies show that governments worldwide do actively enforce information security [28] .
Here, we consider that information security can be and is addressed by government, vendors, and other parties in two ways-facilitating end-user precautions and enforcement against violators of information security (for brevity, we call them "attackers"). Facilitation of end-user precautions includes information and publicity, training and education, technical assistance such as provision of automatic security updates, as well as subsidies. Enforcement includes investigation, prosecution, and punishment of those who infringe information security. Which policy is more cost-effective?
We address this question in the context of both mass (one-to-many) and targeted (one-to-one) attacks and considering strategic interaction between end users and attackers. Mass attacks do not discriminate between specific users and are aimed at an entire class of users, identified by technological platform (e.g., users of a particular operating system-Win32, Mac, or Linux), business purpose (e.g., all bank customers, all Viagra users), or some other way. By contrast, targeted attacks, such as denial-ofservice attacks and system intrusion, are aimed at a particular victim.
Our analysis makes three contributions. First, we show that, for both mass and targeted attacks, facilitating user precaution does unambiguously reduce the expected loss incurred by end users. However, enforcement against attackers has conflicting effects on expected loss: it deters attackers but induces end users to slacken precautions. Hence, the net effect on end users' expected loss depends on the balance between deterring attackers and slackening of end-user precautions.
Second, focusing on end-user welfare under mass attacks, we show that facilitating end-user precautions is more cost-effective than enforcement against attackers the lower the cost of precaution and the cost of attacks. It may seem counterintuitive that facilitation should be more cost-effective when the cost of attacks is lower. The intuitive reason is that when attacks are less costly, attackers would increase attacking effort, which would induce end users to take more effort in precaution. Hence, facilitation would be relatively more effective.
Third, focusing on end-user welfare under targeted attacks, we show that the policy that optimizes consumer (end-user) welfare is rather nuanced with respect to the end user's valuation of security. Facilitating end-user precautions is more effective on users with relatively high valuation for security-because they value security highly, facilitation gives bigger "bang for the buck." By contrast, enforcement against attackers is more effective on users with relatively low valuation for security-they do not value security and so are insensitive to facilitation.
Background Literature academIc scHoLarsHIP Into tHe economIcs of information security has focused on two normative issues. One is policies to prevent security violation and reduce security loss, including policies of software vendors, CErT/CC, and other security specialists to disclose security flaws and provide the appropriate patches [2, 8, 12, 19, 27] , and laws that require disclosure of information security incidents [4, 30, 38] .
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The other strand is users' optimal behavior, including investment in information security [10, 14, 16] , insuring against security breaches [6, 15] , sharing information [5, 13] , and implementation of detection systems [9, 40] . In this vein, Kunreuther and Heal [22, 23] emphasized that individuals' efforts in precautions might yield positive externalities for one another. The expected loss to any user decreases with others' precautions, and hence user precautions are strategic complements.
3 For a wide range of cost and risk parameters, there are two equilibria-either all users invest in precautions or no one does (see also [37] ). To the extent that individuals underinvest in precautions, the government should intervene to subsidize precautions. 4 august and Tunca [3] considered the incentive of users to patch security flaws. In a finding that was reminiscent of the public health literature on infectious diseases, they showed that mandatory patching is not optimal. With commercial software, the optimal policy is a subsidy on patching when security risk and patching costs are high, and no policy otherwise. However, with open source software, the optimal policy is a subsidy on patching when both security risk and patching costs are low, and a tax on software usage otherwise. accordingly, with respect to public policy, previous research tended to focus on the government's role in facilitating user precautions, specifically disclosure of vulnerabilities and encouraging patching. Previous research gave relatively little attention to the government's role in enforcement or other forms of facilitation. Even for previous research that directly addressed the economic incentives of violators of information security, countermeasures were focused on technical strategies rather than enforcement [24, 26] .
given that the government can address information security policies through enduser facilitation and enforcement against attackers, an important yet unanswered question is how it should choose between these policies. It is essential to address this question with due consideration for the context. One aspect is strategic interaction among users and attackers. While previous normative analyses tended to assume the behavior of attackers to be exogenous [10, 15] , this would not make sense in analyzing government enforcement. The other aspect is the nature of attacks and the intended scope of harm. Most previous normative analyses did not consider that attacks could be mass or targeted attacks, and that user and attacker behavior would differ significantly between the two.
5 For effective public policy, it is important to understand the differences in the behavior of attackers and the response of users between mass and targeted attacks.
Basic Setting end users dIffer In tHeIr vaLuatIon of InformatIon securIty, v ∈ [0, v\ ], which is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function, F(v\ ), with v < ∞ being the highest value of information security. Each user knows his or her own valuation, v, and all users are risk neutral.
a user sustains an attack with probability [1 -p]a, where p ∈ [0, 1] is a probability that depends on the user's effort in precautions such as installing patches, scanning suspicious e-mails, or properly configuring a firewall, and a is the attacker's effort. If the user sustains an attack, his or her benefit will be [1 -h] v, where h < 1 measures the harm caused by an attack. 6 The user's cost of effort, p, in precautions is [1 -f]C p (p), which has the properties C dC dp d C dp
and where f represents facilitation of user precautions by the government, vendors, or third parties. 7 With a higher f, the user's cost of precautions would be lower. Each potential user chooses precautions to maximize his or her expected net benefit.
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The attacker chooses attacking effort, a ∈ [0, 1], which is the probability of successful attack, given user's precautions and government enforcement. The attacker derives benefit, which could be monetary or nonmonetary, from an attack on a user, provided that he or she is not subject to enforcement. We assume that the attacker's benefit is bv, where 0 < b < ∞; that is, his or her benefit is finite and positively related to the user's valuation of information security.
9 With probability, η, the authorities would subject the attacker to enforcement, impose a penalty of t, and prevent the attacker from realizing the benefit from attack. Further, the cost of attacking effort is C a (a), where
The attacker chooses effort to maximize his or her expected net benefit. This modeling assumption is consistent with Symantec's [33, p. 55] observation that attackers direct efforts against targets that provide the maximum return. We further assume that attackers are identical.
We consider two extreme scenarios that typify various forms of information security attacks:
1. Mass attacks (one-to-many) a(v) . Examples include denial of service attacks, system intrusion, and pharming.
The key difference between mass and targeted attacks is whether the attack differentiates among victims [31] . In our setting, victims are end users. Hence, phishing e-mails directed at all Citibank customers should be viewed as a mass attack as there is no discrimination among "Citibank customers." (Of course, if the victims were considered to be banks, then phishing e-mails directed at all Citibank customers could be viewed as a targeted attack against Citibank.)
The authorities can address information security through either facilitating enduser precautions (increasing f ) or enforcement against attackers (increasing η). The sequence of events is shown in Figure 1 .
Consider the end user with valuation, v. given the attacker's effort, a, the user's expected net benefit from security would be
By Equation (1), C p (p) is convex, and so B(v | a) must be concave in p. Maximizing with respect to p, dC p dp ahv f
which defines his or her effort in precaution, p(v), as a function of user valuation. Let g p (.) denote the inverse of C ′ p (.), which, by Equation (1), exists, and
Then, Equation (4) yields the user's best response:
, . (v) .
The proofs of this and all other results are presented in the appendix.
Mass attacks
In tHIs sectIon, We anaLyze mass attacKs. We first establish the equilibrium between end users and attackers, and then use the equilibrium to analyze the direct effects of changes in the facilitation of end-user precautions and enforcement rate on user and attacker behavior. Then, we consider the indirect (feedback) effects as users respond to attackers and vice versa. By Observation 1, we know that user effort in precaution increases in the attacker's effort. Next, we consider the attacker's effort as a function of user behavior. We suppose that the attacker chooses attacking effort, a, to maximize expected net benefit,
By Equation (2), C a (a) is convex, and so H(a | p(v)) must be concave in a. Maximizing with respect to a,
Let g a (.) denote the inverse of C ′ a (.), which, by Equation (2), exists, and let
Then, Equation (8) yields the attacker's best response:
where p(v) is a function that maps a user's type, v, and attacker's effort to his or her
Thus, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, (a * , p * ), is such that a * = BR a (p * ) and
Hence, the equilibrium is determined by
and
In equilibrium, the end users' combined expected loss from mass attacks is
user-attacker Equilibrium
For the analysis to be meaningful, Lemma 1 shows that there exists a nontrivial equilibrium between user effort in precautions, p(v), and the attacking effort, a. Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium. a further implication of Equation (8) is that, with mass attacks, the level of information security is determined by the class of users as a whole-a result also shown in Varian [37] . Hence, given attacker behavior, user efforts in precaution efforts are strategic substitutes. If other users raise their precautions, the attacker would reduce his or her effort, which would reduce the expected harm to any particular user, and so the user would rationally respond by reducing his or her effort in precaution. This free-rider problem is consistent with findings by august and Tunca [3] and explains user inertia in taking precautions [17] .
Direct and Indirect Effects
Changes in government policy-facilitation of user precautions, f, and enforcement against attackers, η-directly affect user and attacker behavior. To fully appreciate the effects of changes in government policies, we must also consider the indirect (feedback) effects as users respond to the attacker and vice versa. Table 1 summarizes the results in Proposition 1. Our analysis points to some unintended effects: specifically, enforcement against attackers need not enhance overall information security. an increase in the rate of enforcement against attackers, η, directly leads the attacker to reduce his or her attacking effort. However, there is also an indirect effect: users would respond to the reduced attacking effort by reducing their efforts in precaution. Consequently, the net effect on the expected loss to users depends on the balance between deterring the attacker and slackening of end-user precautions.
By contrast, actions to facilitate user precautions such as education and automatic updating of patches unambiguously reduce expected losses and so improve information security. Facilitation of end-user precautions encourages end users to increase effort in precautions. Further, the increase in user precautions reduces the attacker's expected benefit, and so leads him or her to reduce attacking effort. accordingly, facilitation unambiguously reduces the users' expected loss.
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The results presented in Table 1 also shed light on analytical studies which assume that attacker behavior is exogenous and empirical studies that use a reduced form to estimate the impact of information security policy. any analysis of end-user facilitation which assumes that attacker behavior is exogenous would overlook the indirect effect of the increase in user precautions on attacker effort. Hence, it would underestimate the impact of the facilitation on expected loss to users.
By contrast, any reduced-form analysis or estimate of enforcement against attackers which ignores the indirect effect on user precautions would overestimate the impact of enforcement. Such analysis would overlook that enforcement against attackers would induce attackers to reduce their effort, and so, indirectly, lead users to reduce effort in precautions.
Targeted attacks
In tHIs sectIon, We anaLyze end-user and attacKer beHavIor in the context of targeted attacks. In mass attacks, all end users are subject to the same attacker effort, a. By contrast, in targeted attacks, the attacker may design a specific scheme against each targeted victim, as characterized by the victim's valuation of information security, v.
In targeted attacks, the end-users' behavior is still characterized by Equations (3) and (4). With regard to the attacker, suppose that, with respect to any end user with valuation v, the attacker can choose attacking effort, a(v), to maximize expected benefit. The attacker's expected benefit from all end users is
Comparing Equation (7) with (14), the essential difference is that, in the case of targeted attacks, attacking effort, a, is a function of end-users' valuation of information security, v. Technically, in Equation (14), the attacker's cost is part of the integrand rather than outside the integral. The attacker maximizes H by choosing a(v) that maximizes the expected benefit from each end user with valuation v. Hence, the first-order condition is
We now consider how end users and attacker respond to changes in public policies and each other's behavior. Our next result compares end users' precautions against mass vis-à-vis targeted attacks.
Proposition 2: End users take more effort in precaution against mass attacks than targeted attacks.
recall that end users free-ride in precaution against mass attacks; hence, they underinvest in precautions against mass attacks. Proposition 2 shows that end users take even less effort in precaution against targeted attacks. The reason is that the attacker prefers mass attacks to targeted attacks since, other things equal (including the net benefit per end user attacked), mass attacks reach more users and hence yield higher expected benefit to attackers. Equivalently, mass attacks are more cost-effective for the attacker. End users, anticipating the higher probability of sustaining a mass attack, would take more effort in precaution against mass attacks than targeted attacks.
Proposition 2 emphasizes how the nature of potential attacks may influence end users' effort in precaution. Indeed, among 484 respondents to the 2007 u.S. CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey [29] , 98 percent installed antivirus software (precaution against a mass attack), but only 47 percent installed intrusion prevention systems (precaution against targeted attack). The obvious implication of our analytical result and the survey evidence is that information security policy must be tailored to the threat-one size for all would not be optimal. 
user-attacker Equilibrium
With targeted attacks, there are no externalities among end users. Each end-user's net benefit is independent of other end-users' efforts in precautions. using Equation (15) and g a , the inverse of C ′ a (.), the attacker's best response, for each v,
Thus, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (a * , p * ) is such that, by Equations (6) and (16), a v\ ] , and the equilibrium is defined by
The following result shows that the analysis is meaningful. It is useful to define the end users' combined expected loss from targeted attacks,
Note that L t differs from L m in Equation (13) as the attacker's effort varies with user valuation, v.
With targeted attacks, a central issue is which users will be targeted. We suppose that the attacker would target any user that offers positive expected benefit-that is, H ≥ 0.
12 Hence, the targeting depends on the user's valuation and effort in precaution. Superficially, high-valuation users, with their high v, would seem to present better targets. However, by Observation 1, they would take more effort in precaution. In Observation 2, we present a specific condition under which attackers target low-valuation users. although their valuation is low, they take less effort in precaution, and hence, on balance, attackers prefer to target low-valuation users. This is consistent with Symantec's report (January-June 2006) [34, p. 47 ] that home users were the most highly targeted sector, accounting for 93 percent of all targeted attacks.
Observation 2 (Targeted Attacks of Low-Valuation Users): With targeted attacks, attackers target low-valuation users if the elasticity of end-user effort in precautions with respect to their valuation is relatively high-that is,
Direct and Indirect Effects
With targeted attacks, attackers direct efforts at specific victims. an increase in facilitation would directly lead users to increase precautions. These users would become less attractive and attackers targeting those users would reduce their attacking effort. Combining the direct and indirect effects, the expected loss from targeted attacks is decreasing in the facilitation of precautions. an increase in enforcement rate has conflicting effects on the expected loss. It would deter attackers, leading them to reduce their attacking effort. However, this would then lead users to reduce their precautions. The net effect on the expected loss depends on the balance between deterrence of attackers and slackening of user precautions. By Propositions 1 and 3, the net effects of facilitation and enforcement, taking account of both direct and indirect effects, are consistent across mass and targeted attacks. We summarize the analytical findings in the following proposition: 
Proposition 4 (Common Effects of Facilitation and Enforcement in Mass and

Social Welfare
HoW sHouLd socIety cHoose betWeen facILItatIng end-user precautions and enforcement against attackers? We address this question from the standpoint of social welfare. In general, welfare could possibly include the net benefits of both end users as well as attacker. However, we exclude the attacker's benefits and costs from the measure of welfare [36] . accordingly, social welfare for mass and targeted attacks simplifies to
respectively. In Equations (20) and (21), the integrands are end-users' net benefit, while C f (f ) and C η (η) represent the costs to the government of facilitating user precautions and enforcement against attackers, respectively. a direct implication of Equations (20) and (21) is that end users have insufficient incentive to invest in precautions. When choosing their efforts in precaution, victims ignore the government's costs of facilitation and enforcement. accordingly, they underspend on precautions. This implication parallels the literature on externalities and crimes in general (see [18] ).
To compare the relative impact of facilitation vis-à-vis enforcement on welfare, we need some basis of comparison. although cost is an important factor in comparing alternative policies, we consider it more insightful to focus on the differences in the effectiveness of the alternative policies. accordingly, we focus on end-user welfare, ignoring the government's cost of facilitation and enforcement. Further, in order to derive closed-form solutions for simple analysis, we assume that the costs of the two policies are quadratic:
In the following result, we compare the marginal effects of facilitation vis-à-vis enforcement to derive:
Proposition 5 (Conditions for Achieving End-User Welfare): Considering enduser welfare, (a) with mass attacks, facilitating end-user precautions is more cost-effective than enforcement against attackers when the cost of precaution and cost of attacking effort are sufficiently low:
4 1 1 2 2 2 0 c c f bh v d v p a v − [ ] − [ ] < ( ) ∫ η Φ ;(23)
(b) with targeted attacks, facilitating end-user precautions is more effective on users with relatively high valuation for security, v > v] , while enforcement against attackers is more effective on users with relatively low valuation for security, v ≤ v] , where
regarding the first result (Proposition 5a), it may seem counterintuitive that facilitation should be more cost-effective when the cost of attacks is lower. The intuitive reason is that when attacks are less costly, attackers would increase attacking effort, which would induce end users to take more effort in precaution. Hence, facilitation would be relatively more effective. The intuition with respect to the cost of precautions is simpler. a lower cost of precaution directly encourages end-user precautions and so reduces attackers' benefit from attacking and indirectly reduces attackers' effort. accordingly, the lower cost of precaution clearly makes facilitation relatively more effective.
a striking implication of Proposition 5b is that information security policy should differentiate between users according to their value for security. This is intuitive because for high-value users, their elasticity with respect to facilitation is higher (simply because they get more "bang for the buck" out of effort in precaution); hence, facilitation is more effective with them. By contrast, facilitation is less effective with low-value users, and so the best policy must be enforcement.
by comParIng tHe combInatIon of dIrect and IndIrect effects of the two security measures in mass vis-à-vis targeted attacks, we show that facilitating end-user precautions unequivocally reduces end-users' expected loss from both mass and targeted attacks. However, the net effect of enforcement on expected loss depends on the balance between deterring attackers and slackening of end-user precautions.
Commercial malware is fast growing. an online search quickly reveals numerous offers of software or services to crack passwords, provide dictionary attacks, log keystrokes, and capture screens. Like legitimate things, the Internet is reducing the cost of malicious activities as well. Our analysis suggests that, to surely reduce expected loss, facilitation of end-user precautions would be more effective than increasing enforcement.
We also showed that, with targeted attacks, the information security policy should be differentiated according to the users' valuation for security. The optimal policy is facilitation of precautions for high-value users and enforcement against attackers for low-value users. Cybercriminals definitely distinguish targets by value: in the underground market for bank account credentials, accounts containing more money command a higher selling price [35, p. 20] .
14 Our analysis suggests that information security policy should focus on facilitating precautions among such high-value users.
Of necessity and for simplicity, our study is subject to several limitations. We implicitly assumed that end users perceived the information security risk to be sufficiently low as not to affect their participation in the activity exposing them to risk; for instance, the risk of phishing did not deter any consumer from using online banking. While this assumption is common in studies of information security, its validity is an empirical issue. accordingly, an important direction for future analytical work is to endogenize the participation of end users in the activity exposing them to information security risk.
We couched the analysis and discussion in terms of the government's information security policy. But the government is not alone in facilitating user precautions and enforcement against attackers. Vendors play a large role in both, and, indeed, possibly a larger role in facilitation. We should emphasize that, to the extent that vendors are concerned with user welfare, our analytical results apply to vendors' information security policy subject to one proviso. Proposition 5 focused on consumer welfare and ignored the costs of facilitation and enforcement. Clearly, a vendor would not ignore these costs. Hence, our results should be interpreted as being relative to the costs of facilitation vis-à-vis enforcement.
We separately analyzed scenarios of mass attacks and targeted attacks. However, attackers may actively choose the nature and scope of attacks. Further, mass attacks and targeted attacks may differ in cost and detection mechanisms. Hence, another possible direction for future analytical work is to endogenize attackers' choice between mass and targeted attacks.
Finally, our analysis is subject to the limitation that end users and attackers were assumed to be risk neutral. allowing risk aversion would considerably increase the complexity of the analysis. The impact of risk aversion is not a priori obvious. among users, those choosing high precautions (p close to 1) would reduce their risk by increasing their precautions toward p = 1, while those choosing low precautions (p close to 0) would reduce their risk by reducing their precautions toward p = 0. accordingly, allowing for risk aversion is an important but challenging direction for future work. [15] studied users' incentives in self-protection and self-insurance in five threat models but assumed the behavior of attackers to be exogenous.
6. This setup is similar to that in the literature on enforcement against copyright piracy (see [11] ). Full harm is the case of h = 1. Insurance is one reason the user might sustain less than full harm, h < 1.
7. This is generalized from the quadratic cost function as widely assumed in economic analyses of information security [13, 21] .
8. For simplicity, we implicitly assume that all end users engage in the activity that exposes them to the information security risk. Equivalently, end users perceive the information security risk to be sufficiently low as not to affect their participation. This assumption is common in economic analyses of information security.
9. according to Symantec's [35, p. 21 ] report on the underground economy, credentials of bank accounts with larger amounts of funds commanded higher prices. This shows that the attacker's potential profit is directly associated with the user's loss. However, the attacker's benefit may be larger than the user's loss; e.g., for computers enslaved into a botnet, their owners' loss may be trivial compared to the benefit of the perpetrator.
10. august and Tunca [3] employed a discrete model to study user incentives to patch and showed that offering rebates for patching could enhance security. Their result depends on their assumption that users' choice is binary-either patch or do not patch. By contrast, our model allows users a continuous choice.
11. We omit the proof as it is essentially similar to that of Lemma 1. 12. Note that, by Equation (14), the attacker's expected benefit H takes account of the increasing marginal cost of attacking effort, C a (.).
13. The quadratic cost function is widely used in economic analyses of information security [13, 21] .
14. Note that these accounts have already been compromised, so end-users' precautions have failed. Hence, the higher price does not contradict our result that high-value users take more precautions. Our analysis focused on ex ante precautions. 13. gal-Or, E., and ghose, a. The economic incentives for sharing security information. Information Systems Research, 16, 2 (June 2005), 186-208. 14. gordon, L.a., and Loeb, M.P. The economics of information security investment. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 5, 4 (November 2002), 438-457. 15. grossklags, J.; Christin, N.; and Chuang, J. Security investment (failures) Economics, 27, 1 (Spring 1996), 197-206. 19. Jaisingh, J., and Li, Q. 
Proof of Lemma 1
We first prove the existence of the equilibrium between end user and attacker. referring to Equation (8) 
For all other values of η and p(v), the attacker would choose lower effort. accordingly, without loss of generality, we can limit the attacker's choice of effort to the interval [0, a[ ]. Now Equation (11) 
Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting Equation (6) into (11), we have
Substituting Equation (10) into (12), we have
We derive the empirical implications by implicit differentiation with respect to γ and β. Differentiating Equation (a5) with respect to β, we have because g′ p > 0 and g′ a > 0. Thus, the attacker's effort is increasing in β, so decreasing in η, and decreasing in γ, so decreasing in f.
Differentiating Equation (a6) Because g′ p > 0, g a > 0, and g′ a > 0, the right-hand side of Equation (a10) is positive and γ βvg′ p g′ a > 0; hence we have ∂p * (v)/∂γ > 0. Thus, end-user's effort in precautions is increasing in β, so decreasing in η, and increasing in γ, so increasing in f. Since the attacker's effort, a, is decreasing in facilitation, f, and end-user's effort in precautions, p, is increasing in f, the total expected loss, L m , by Equation (13), is decreasing in f. However, the attacker's effort, a, is decreasing in enforcement, η, while end-user's effort in precautions, p, is also
We derive the empirical implications by implicit differentiation with respect to γ and β. as the proof is essentially similar to that of Proposition 1, we omit the intermediate steps and only report the end results.
Differentiating Equation (a15) with respect to β, and solving, 
Thus, we can see that the attacker's effort is increasing in β, so decreasing in η, and decreasing in γ, so decreasing in f. Differentiating Equation (a20) with respect to β, and solving, 
Differentiating Equation (a20) with respect to γ, and solving,
